As important as these enduring realities of Afghanistan are, they are greatly exacerbated by the severity of the situation at hand. Whatever ultimate plan the surge is meant to effect, the hard fact is that there are imposing obstacles to its tactical success, however wise newly elected President Obama’s ultimate strategy is.
DEFINING AFGHANISTAN’S “INSURGENCY”
The first is the considerable strength of the Afghan insurgency at this point. “Taliban” is too simplistic a term to describe it. Disappointment at the failings of the process initiated at Bonn and the traditional Afghan propensity to back political forces that seem to have the advantage in any given struggle has led many other groups and individuals to take up arms against the coalition consisting of the Afghan government and its international backers. They range from followers of veteran fundamentalist warlords of the anti-Soviet struggle—such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani—to narcotraffickers to unemployed men who are simply guns for hire.
More ominous is accumulating evidence that the Pakistani military establishment and its main intelligence gathering agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), continues to support the Taliban and their allies. The hide-in-plain-sight existence of the Taliban leadership, including, apparently, its supreme commander, Mullah Omar, in the city of Quetta, has been cited for years as proof that Pakistan was not serious about this new alliance with the US, which only came about in the midst of world condemnation of its pro-Taliban stand and as the result of an American ultimatum. Numerous indications over the last several years that Pakistani agents were involved in supplying weaponry, logistical help, and even advance notice of coalition military actions obtained from the Americans themselves in intelligence briefings to the insurgents from the Tribal Areas added to these suspicions. Although whether this is a result of the central policies of the country’s military-security services complex itself or only the work of “rogue elements” has been disputed. The accusations reached a climax last July when American intelligence intercepted communications between known ISI agents and the Haqqani network, which proved that these Pakistani operatives had aided the later in their devastating suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 58 people last July.
Another pitfall is the growing the hostility of the Afghan population at large towards the coalition due to civilian deaths stemming from airstrikes and other military actions, reports of human rights abuses inflicted on detainees, and failed economic promises. This negativity is not limited to rural traditionalists or committed fundamentalists, but can be found even among the most progressive segments of society. “Over 85 percent of Afghans are living below the poverty line and don’t have enough to eat,” said Malalai Joya, a former member of the Afghan parliament who won international notice for her strong stands on women’s rights and blunt denunciations of warlord abuses that eventually led to her expulsion from the legislative body. Addressing the view of international forces in terms of equivalence with her traditional foes, she continued, “While the US military spends $65,000 a minute in Afghanistan for its operations, up to 18 million people out of a population of 26 million live on less than $2 a day. As soon as possible, the US and NATO troops must vacate our country. With the withdrawal of the occupation forces, we will have to face one enemy instead of two.”
THE DEBATE OVER OPTIONS
In the face of such an intractable situation, it has been said that the greatest obstacle facing the planned US surge of troops into Afghanistan and any ensuing foundation it is hoped the surge will lay toward stabilizing the country is the limited window of opportunity on hand. The perfect storm of Afghan impatience with the international presence, the weakness of the Karzai government, and the relentlessly rising violence of the insurgency may soon create a security vacuum so vast that the ensuing chaos would be blamed on America’s intervention after 9/11 by the native population. Only a policy that improves these conditions dramatically can restore a level of goodwill that will enable the coalition to pursue the goals the United States set out to achieve when it toppled the Taliban. In the broadest spectrum, the strategic options being discussed in government, the military, and among analysts are: 1) withdrawal, 2) comprehensive surge, and 3) containment.