True, Chávez’s grandiose projects are buttressed by seductive rhetoric and record oil prices, but both within Venezuela and throughout the region there are signs of a growing reluctance to accept his outsized political ambitions.
CRUDE AWAKENING
Chávez’s defiance of Washington has been a defining characteristic of his regime from the outset. His unrelenting critique of Venezuela’s old order—which he refers to as “the rancid oligarchy”—has often
focused on the support it received from US administrations over the decades; he sees the US government and the Venezuelan opposition as indistinguishable. His speeches are peppered with virulent anti-American rhetoric, charging Washington with imperialist designs and systematic exploitation of the poor.
Ever since Chávez came to power, Washington has been at a loss as to how to deal with him. Its messages—sometimes conciliatory, sometimes confrontational, usually contradictory—have been largely reactive and show little in the way of strategic thinking. A turning point in the increasingly troubled US-Venezuelan relationship came when the Bush administration endorsed the military coup against Chávez in April 2002. Although precisely what happened at the time remains unclear, Washington’s rush to express approval for such a blatantly unconstitutional act undermined US credibility on the democracy issue. It also distanced the Bush administration from many Latin American allies, who rightfully expressed concern about Chávez’s ouster (which proved temporary).
Since then, Chávez has invoked the incident to make his case that the United States is determined to bring about “regime change” in Venezuela. That argument has been made with even greater conviction—and, for many Latin Americans, with no small measure of plausibility—following the US invasion of Iraq. Chávez has predictably taken advantage of the hugely unpopular Iraq war to pound away even more at the Bush administration.
Yet even as political relations between Caracas and Washington have deteriorated, Venezuelan oil has continued to flow to the United States. So far, all of the apparent antipathy has not affected that key commercial relationship, which has forestalled a more serious clash between the two countries. The United States gets some 14 percent of its imported oil from Venezuela; more than 50 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports go to the United States.
SLOUCHING TOWARD AUTHORITARIANISM
The Colombian magazine Semana, no friend of Chávez, named the Venezuelan president 2005’s “man of the year” for having “modified the political map of the subcontinent, distributed his oil wealth in every direction, challenged the United States, and gone from being perceived as a tropical clown to the Latin American leader with the greatest political influence.” And there is no sign that Chávez has any intention of slowing down.
On the national front, Chávez is resolutely consolidating his autocratic governance model. The National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the articles for a constitutional reform that will be submitted to a national referendum on December 2. The 69 amendments cover private property, social security, central bank autonomy, the length of the workday, and much more. But the centerpiece of the overall package is a reform to allow the Venezuelan president—but no other office holders—to be reelected indefinitely. Other proposed changes would give Chávez instruments to further control the economy and suppress dissent.
There is little doubt that Chávez’s December 2 referendum will pass. After polls showed around 60 percent of Venezuelans opposed the indefinite reelection proposition, Chávez quickly added sweeteners, such as reducing the workday from eight to six hours. The political opposition continues to be divided and ambivalent about whether to participate in what they see as a rigged system. It was a shortsighted 2005 legislative boycott by the opposition that left the National Assembly filled with only Chávez supporters.
Still, Chávez’s not-so-subtle push to be “president for life” has revealed one of the regime’s real soft spots. Compounded by declining oil production, persistent corruption, skyrocketing crime rates, inflation, drug trafficking, and continued infrastructure problems, these weaknesses have deepened fissures within the
government coalition—and created openings for new opposition forces. In the National Assembly, the pro-Chávez Podemos party openly opposed the indefinite reelection measure. More significantly, student leaders—who emerged earlier this year when Chávez failed to renew the license for the RCTV station—have mobilized once again against Chávez’s rush toward authoritarianism. These street demonstrations
have highlighted Venezuela’s sharp polarization (and led Chávez recently to hint that he may break the referendum into two or three blocks of amendments, which would be voted on independently).
Chávez’s capacity to govern the country is not unlimited. A drop in oil prices, although unlikely in the near term, would prove highly problematic for his plans. There are credible reports of large-scale corruption within the regime and, as evidenced by infrastructure problems, major inefficiencies in the economy and the public sector. Shortages in basic commodities have begun to appear sporadically, the result of prolonged price controls. Incipient splits within Chávez’s amorphous coalition could become more pronounced and create problems for governance. And although Chávez himself remains popular, polls indicate that the population is becoming increasingly dissatisfied over a variety of key issues.
